EUSANCT: Funktionieren supranationale Zwangsmassnahmen? Beginn, Wirkung und Effektivität von EU-Sanktionen.

Beschreibung

EUSANCT: Funktionieren supranationale Zwangsmassnahmen? Beginn, Wirkung und Effektivität von EU-Sanktionen.

Funding: BEETHOVEN (Collaborative Scheme of German Reserach Foundation (DFG) and National Science Centre (NCN))

Economic sanctions are one of the most frequently used coercive measures in international politics. Although the European Union increasingly relies on this instrument since the end of the Cold War, the sanctioning policy of the supranational organization faces severe criticism. These objections include the accusations that the EU levies sanctions against the wrong target and that the effects are either negligible or even counterproductive. The EUSANCT project addresses these concerns and examines the onset, economic impact and effectiveness of EU sanctions through an over-arching political economy framework that extends existing sanctioning games. Understanding economic coercion as a stepwise process, the German-Polish research team will:

  • examine the extent to which coercive policymaking by the supranational organization is biased;
  • analyse the short- and long-term economic repercussions of sanctions in selected target countries by estimating financial market reactions and changes in trade, investment and development;
  • establish the short- and long-term economic consequences of these sanctions in two sender countries (Germany, Poland) by focusing on the stock market returns of exposed and less exposed sectors and firms;
  • assess the effectiveness of EU sanctions.

The four subprojects will complement each other and provide a comprehensive evaluation of the supranational sanctioning policy of the European Union between 1990 and 2014. To this end, the EUSANCT team will extend existing data sets on the threats and imposition of economic sanctions and use a broad mix of quantitative and qualitative techniques to answers the questions raised within the different subprojects. The project will enlighten academic and policy audiences about the chances and limitations of EU sanctions and discuss how the design of sanctions influences their impact and effectiveness.

Project duration:
01.06.2016 - 31.05.2019

Principal investigators:
Prof. Dr. Paulina Pospieszna (Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznan, Poland)
Prof. Dr. Gerald Schneider (University of Konstanz, Germany)

Institutionen
  • FB Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft
Publikationen
    Weber, Patrick M.; Schneider, Gerald (2022): Post-Cold War sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US : Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset Conflict Management and Peace Science ; 39 (2022), 1. - S. 97-114. - Sage Publications. - ISSN 0738-8942. - eISSN 2577-9141

Post-Cold War sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US : Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset

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The European Union, the United Nations, and the United States frequently use economic sanctions. This article introduces the EUSANCT Dataset—which amends, merges, and updates some of the most widely used sanctions databases—to trace the evolution of sanctions after the Cold War. The dataset contains case-level and dyadic information on 326 threatened and imposed sanctions by the EU, the UN, and the US. We show that the usage and overall success of sanctions have not grown from 1989 to 2015 and that while the US is the most active sanctioner, the EU and the UN appear more successful.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

    Weber, Patrick M.; Stępień, Beata (2020): Conform or Challenge? : Adjustment Strategies of Sanction-torn Companies The World Economy ; 43 (2020), 11. - S. 3006-3024. - Wiley. - ISSN 0378-5920. - eISSN 1467-9701

Conform or Challenge? : Adjustment Strategies of Sanction-torn Companies

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Weber, Patrick M.; Stępień, Beata

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

    Pospieszna, Paulina; Weber, Patrick M. (2020): Amplifying and nullifying the impact of democratic sanctions through aid to civil society International Interactions ; 46 (2020), 5. - S. 724-748. - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. - ISSN 0305-0629. - eISSN 1547-7444

Amplifying and nullifying the impact of democratic sanctions through aid to civil society

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Both foreign aid and sanctions are foreign policy tools to promote democracy. Yet, it is unclear how far incentives and coercion enhance democratization. Since sanctions and aid are often employed at the same time, the goal of this study is to determine their joint effect on democratization in target/recipient countries. We argue that sending democracy aid through civil society organizations enhances the effectiveness of sanctions as a democracy promotion tool because the civil society is empowered to introduce democratic changes. Thus, in addition to the top-down pressure on the target government created by sanctions, there is a bottom-up pressure exerted by the civil society. Our empirical results show that democratic sanctions by the European Union and the United States are more likely to have a positive effect when aid flows bypass the government. Conversely, aid channeled through the public sector mitigates the generally positive effect of sanctions on democracy. In order to estimate these joint effects, we employ a new comprehensive dataset on economic sanctions: the EUSANCT Dataset which integrates and updates existing databases on sanctions for the period between 1989 and 2015, merged with disaggregated OECD aid data and V-Dem democracy scores.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

  Weber, Patrick M.; Schneider, Gerald (2020): How Many Hands to Make Sanctions Work? : Comparing EU and US Sanctioning Efforts European Economic Review ; 130 (2020). - 103595. - Elsevier. - ISSN 0014-2921. - eISSN 1873-572X

How Many Hands to Make Sanctions Work? : Comparing EU and US Sanctioning Efforts

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One of the core disputes in the literature on economic statecraft addresses the conditions under which multilateral sanctions are more successful than unilateral ones. Our game-theoretic model implies that extant assessments do not sufficiently differentiate between the varying abilities of multilateral and unilateral senders in credibly threatening and carrying out sanctions. We introduce a selection argument that focuses on the complex decision-making process of the European Union (EU) to impose sanctions. In comparison to the United States (US), the institutional structure of the EU and conflicting economic interests of multiple principals make the imposition of sanctions much more difficult. In addition, the international organization is less accountable vis-à-vis the voters. Both mechanisms render sanction threats by the EU less credible. Since the United States as a unilateral sender can issue more credible sanction threats, imposed US sanctions are a negative selection of cases and thus less successful than restrictive measures imposed by the EU. We test these propositions with a new dataset on threatened and imposed sanctions by the European Union and the United States for the period between 1989 and 2015. The empirical evidence demonstrates that EU sanctions are indeed more successful than those by the US. In contrast, US sanction threats are more successful than those by the EU. We provide evidence for the difficulties of multilateral senders to impose sanctions by showing that EU sanctions are both less likely and less severe, the more varied the economic links of the multilateral sender with the sanctioned state are.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

    Schneider, Gerald; Weber, Patrick M. (2019): Biased, But Surprisingly Effective : Economic Coercion after the End of the Cold War CESifo Forum ; 20 (2019), 04/2019. - S. 9-13. - ISSN 1615-245X. - eISSN 2190-717X

Biased, But Surprisingly Effective : Economic Coercion after the End of the Cold War

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This article analyzes the sanction threats and impositions by the EU, the UN, and the US in the period between 1989 and 2015, demonstrating that the popular perception of economic coercion is largely mistaken. We show against the backdrop of high-profile failures that the sanction threats and impositions of the United States and the two International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) were often striving to achieve the dominant goal of protecting key liberal values such as the protection of free elections and human rights, but that the design of the coercive measures was frequently flawed.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

    Stępień, Beata; Weber, Patrick M. (2019): Passive, Aggressive or Creative? : Adjustment Strategies of Companies Affected by Sanctions International Business in a VUCA World : The Changing Role of States and Firms / Van Tulder, Rob; Verbeke, Alain; Jankowska, Barbara (Hrsg.). - Bingley : Emerald Publishing, 2019. - (Progress in International Business Research ; 14). - S. 131-156. - ISBN 978-1-83867-256-0

Passive, Aggressive or Creative? : Adjustment Strategies of Companies Affected by Sanctions

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The probability of sanctions’ effectiveness increases not only due to their severity for the target country’s economy but is also a function of adherence to their principles by enterprises from senders’ countries. Sanctions avoidance and increasing investments in the target country (the observed behavior of many companies facing the European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia which were imposed in 2014) mitigate the impact of these restrictive measures. In this chapter we show (by analyzing adaptation strategies of EU enterprises affected by sanctions imposed on Russia by EU) how particular types of strategies affect the effectiveness of sanctions and what factors determine the choice of their respective behavior. We draw our conclusions from the online survey of more than 1,000 responses from British, French, German, Italian, and Polish enterprises. We find that while administrative burdens make conformance to sanctions more likely, market dependency and non-tangible assets in the target country induce strategies that challenge sanction policies. We conclude that the EU–Russian sanctions dispute incentivizes European companies to increase their engagement in Russia. These so-called defiance strategies diminish the real economic effect of the sanctions and generate a new equilibrium which outlasts the lifting of these restrictive measures and has negative long-term political implications.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

  Weber, Patrick Maximilian (2019): The Imposition and Effectiveness of Sanctions : “It’s the Economy, Stupid!”

The Imposition and Effectiveness of Sanctions : “It’s the Economy, Stupid!”

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When sender states consider the imposition of sanctions, they also take into account the consequences that these measures have on their own economy and on their domestic economic actors. How do these economic considerations affect the imposition of sanctions as well as the effectiveness of coercive measures after their imposition?

Trade restrictions that have been imposed because of the perceived political misbehavior of a target state do not simply limit the activities between the governments of the sanctioning states and the target state. Sender governments rather have to restrict the activities of their own domestic actors in the target country. Despite the importance of economic actors within sender states, their role has often been neglected in research on sanctions. The goal of this dissertation is to provide a conceptual framework for the different aspects how economic considerations affect the imposition and effectiveness of sanctions. I show that there are three important dimensions: first, lobbying by economic actors can lead to restrictive measures that are less comprehensive than they would have been without these efforts. Second, there are resulting selection effects on the effectiveness of sanctions, which reflect the impact of domestic economic actors on the sanctioning process. Finally, the way companies of the sanctioning states operate in a sanctions regime also has an impact on the effectiveness of these measures. This dissertation contributes four articles to analyze these different dimensions.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

  Schneider, Gerald; Weber, Patrick M. (2018): Wirtschaftskriege Handbuch Staat / Voigt, Rüdiger (Hrsg.). - Wiesbaden : Springer VS, 2018. - S. 1979-1988. - ISBN 978-3-658-20743-4

Wirtschaftskriege

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Schneider, Gerald; Weber, Patrick M.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

    Schneider, Gerald; Weber, Patrick M. (2018): Punishing Putin : EU Sanctions Are More than Paper Tigers stars insights. - Weinfelden : stars - for Leaders of the Next Generation, 2018

Punishing Putin : EU Sanctions Are More than Paper Tigers

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Schneider, Gerald; Weber, Patrick M.

Forschungszusammenhang (Projekte)

Mittelgeber
Name Kennziffer Beschreibung Laufzeit
Sachbeihilfe/Normalverfahren749/15
Weitere Informationen
Laufzeit: 01.06.2016 – 31.05.2019