EU3D: EU Differentation, Dominance and Democracy
- FB Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft
|(2022): Public support for differentiated integration : individual liberal values and concerns about member state discrimination Journal of European Public Policy ; 29 (2022), 2. - S. 218-237. - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. - ISSN 1350-1763. - eISSN 1466-4429||
Public support for differentiated integration : individual liberal values and concerns about member state discrimination
Research on differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union has burgeoned in recent years. However, we still know little about citizens’ attitudes towards the phenomenon. In this article, we argue that at the level of individual citizens, liberal economic values increase support for DI. Stronger preferences for equality, in contrast, make opposition to the concept more likely. Similarly, concerns about discriminatory differentiation at the member state level lead citizens to oppose DI. We test the theoretical claims by analysing survey data on citizens’ attitudes towards a ‘multi-speed Europe’. Supporters of DI, indeed, are marked by liberal economic attitudes. In contrast to general EU support, we do not find robust correlations with socio-demographic variables. Moreover, the data reveal striking differences amongst macro-regions: support for DI has become much lower in Southern European states. We attribute this opposition to negative repercussions of the Eurozone crisis.
|(2020): No Representation without Integration! : Why Differentiated Integration Challenges the Composition of the European Parliament Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) ; 58 (2020), 4. - S. 1016-1033. - Wiley. - ISSN 0021-9886. - eISSN 1468-5965||
No Representation without Integration! : Why Differentiated Integration Challenges the Composition of the European Parliament
This article provides a normative assessment of parliamentary representation in fields of differentiated integration in the European Union. Based on three criteria of legitimate democratic representation, autonomy, accountability and equality, we evaluate four alternative representation models. These models comprise (I) complete representation of all members of the European Parliament (MEPs), (II) insider representation through the creation of new, regime‐specific assemblies, and (III) partial representation without and (IV) with inclusive deliberative stages. We find that the current system of complete representation, while honouring the principle of equality, violates autonomy and accountability in areas of differentiated integration. We therefore advocate a model of partial representation: MEPs elected in opt‐out states should not take part in EP voting but should be invited to participate in the deliberative stages of parliamentary decision‐making. This reconciles the principles of autonomy, accountability and equality, at least as long as there is no truly European electoral system in place.
|(2020): National Concerns and Individual Liberal Values Explain Support for Differentiated Integration in the European Union||
National Concerns and Individual Liberal Values Explain Support for Differentiated Integration in the European Union
Research on the extent and causes of differentiated integration in the European Union has burgeoned in recent years. However, we still know little about citizens’ attitudes towards the phenomenon. In this article, we argue that both country- and individual-level factors should affect support for differentiated integration. Specifically, building on the difference between exemptive and discriminatory differentiation, we expect citizens of Southern member states to stronger oppose and those of Northern and Eastern member states to support the concept of a ‘multi-speed Europe’. On the individual level, we expect general attitudes towards politics and society to matter. Survey data largely corroborates our expectations: Support for differentiated integration is indeed much lower in Southern Europe. On the individual level, we find that supporters are highly educated and marked by liberal-conservative attitudes. In contrast to general EU support, we do not find robust correlations with socio-demographic variables.
|Period:||01.02.2019 – 31.01.2023|